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I. INTRODUCTION
GateHouse Media, Inc. (“GateHouse”), which publishes over 500 publica-
tions across more than 20 states in the U.S.,1 has been on an economic slide since 
its initial public offering on October 25, 2006.2  With less than three years having 
passed since the company initially appeared on the New York Stock Exchange at a 
price of $18,3 GateHouse now finds itself trading on the over-the-counter markets 
for as low as $.03.4  This financial malaise is not manifesting itself exclusively at 
GateHouse and its newspapers and magazines, but rather is an overall symptom of 
the entire print industry.5
* J.D. / M.B.A. Candidate (2010), Washington University in St. Louis; B.S. Marketing (2005) and B.S. 
Entrepreneurial Management (2005), University of Minnesota – Twin Cities. I would like to acknowl-
edge Professor Michael Siebecker for his helpful direction while writing this paper, but most important-
ly I would like to thank the light of my life, Marianne Frapwell.
1 Hoovers.com, GateHouse Media, Inc. Overview, http://www.hoovers.com/gatehouse-media/--
ID__55842--/freeuk-co-factsheet.xhtml (last visited Mar. 6, 2009).
2 See Bloomberg.com, GateHouse Media, Inc. Charts, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/cbuilder
?ticker1=GHSE%3AUS (follow “3Y” button) (last visited Mar. 6, 2009).   
3 Ana Campoy, GateHouse Media IPO Prices at $18 a Share, MARKETWATCH, Oct. 24, 2006, 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/gatehouse-media-ipo-prices-at-18-a-share. 
4 OTC Bulletin Board, http://www.otcbb.com/asp/Info_Center.asp (last visited Mar. 6, 2009); see 
also U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Trading and Markets, http://www.sec.gov/
divisions/marketreg/mrotc.shtml (last visited Mar. 6, 2009).  
5 Shira Ovide, More Newspapers File For Chapter 11, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2009, at B2, available 
at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123524807032741025.html? mod= testMod.
2 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. III:I
The Peoria Journal Star (“Journal Star”), which was purchased by GateH-
ouse in 2007,6 is teetering on the brink of financial collapse.7  The Journal Star is 
the victim of a widening decline in newspaper circulation due to an increase in 
competition from the Internet as well as cable.8 Faced with the threat of needing to 
shut down its presses, a coalition of Journal Star employees along with the Peoria 
Newspaper Guild and community leaders have been exploring alternatives on how 
to save the local newspaper.9 The alliance attempting to save the Journal Star has 
explored options such as co-ops and employee stock ownership plans.10 However, 
the group has instead opted to pursue a long-term ownership strategy centered on 
making the Journal Star a low-profit limited liability company (“L3C”).11 If things 
go as planned, the Journal Star will separate itself from its parent, GateHouse, and 
turn itself into a community-owned operation.12
The Journal Star is not the sole company that has sought to become a 
L3C.13 Numerous other businesses, especially non-profits, are seeking to find oth-
er means to raise capital.14
Part II of this article provides a history of the L3C movement.  In addition, 
Part II offers a look at the current legal landscape of L3Cs on a federal and state 
level.  Part III offers a glimpse into possible problems that L3Cs may run into, in-
cluding registration and disclosure requirements with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”).  In addition, Part III will examine what the fiduciary obliga-
tions will be in L3Cs.  Finally, Part III concludes by exploring the possibility of 
overlapping governmental policing that may occur as more of these entities sprout 
up.  
In light of this growing popularity with L3Cs, an ex-
amination is needed to determine whether or not these entities are the answer for 
cash-strapped organizations like the Journal Star.  
6 Peoria Journal Star, Recent Timeline, http://www.pjstarpeoria.com/online/services/journalstar
history.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2009).   
7 Bill Richards, The Peoria Plan for Saving Local Dailies, CROSSCUT, Jan. 27, 2009, 
http://crosscut.com/2009/01/27/seattle-newspapers/18808/; see also Week.com, More Layoffs in Peoria 
Area, Jan. 22, 2009, http://www.week.com/news/local/38171694.html.  
8 Annys Shin, Newspaper Circulation Continues to Decline, WASH. POST, May 3, 2005, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/02/AR2005050201457.html. 
9 Sally Duros, How to Save Newspapers, HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 9, 2009, http://www.huffington
post.com/sally-duros/how-to-save-newspapers_b_164849.html.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Richards, supra note 7.
13 Mike Gallagher, New State L3C Legislation Creates Tool for Economic Revitalization,
http://www.michiganfoundations.org/s_cmf/doc.asp?C ID=335&DID=22992 (last visited Mar. 8, 
2009).  
14 Clara Miller, The Equity Capital Gap, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Summer 2008, at 41, 
available at http://www.nonprofitfinancefund.org/docs/2008/ssir_summer_2008_equity_capital_gap
.pdf.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The History of L3Cs
Congress has set the mandatory distribution rate for private foundations at 
five percent of the excess of the aggregate fair market value of all assets of the 
foundation.15 This means that in order to maintain their tax-exempt status, all pri-
vate foundations need to distribute at least five percent of the average value of non-
charitable-use assets on an annual basis through qualified distributions.16 In addi-
tion, a private foundation faces the threat of an excise tax if it participates in what 
the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) deems to be a high-risk or “jeopardizing” in-
vestment.17 One exception to this tax is a program related investment (“PRI”).18
Typically, private foundations have chosen to distribute grants, rather than undergo 
a lengthy and costly private letter ruling from the IRS in order to ensure that their 
investment constituted a PRI.19
In an effort to address problems he was having investing family foundation 
money in sustainable and effective ways, Robert Lang, CEO of the Mary Elizabeth 
& Gordon B. Mannweiler Foundation, devised the L3C concept in 2005.20
15 26 U.S.C. § 4942(e)(1) (2006); see also Treas. Reg. § 53.4942(a)-2(c)(5)(i)(e) (as amended in 
1983).
Lang 
believed L3Cs to be an effective vehicle for private foundations to both earn a de-
16 Id. See also Treas. Reg. § 53.4942(a)-3(a)(2) (as amended in 1986) and Community Wealth 
Ventures, The L3C: Low-Profit Limited Liability Company Research Brief, July 2008, 
http://www.americans forcommunitydevelopment.org/supportingdownloads/CWVBrief-Updated.pdf 
(mentioning that “the minimum distribution amount is based upon a minimum investment return of 5% 
on the average fair market value of non-charitable-use-assets-generally those that are not currently used 
for a charitable purpose.  Charitable-use assets include all assets purchased for exempt purposes, pro-
gram-related investments and 1.5% of the average value of cash and marketable securities that are not 
program-related investments.  PRIs are qualified distributions that can satisfy this requirement”).  
17 26 U.S.C. § 4944 (2006); see also Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1(a)(2) (as amended in 1973).  
18 Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a) (1972) (defined as a (i) the primary purpose of the investment is to 
accomplish one or more religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster 
national or international amateur sports competition; (ii) no significant purpose of the investment is the 
production of income or the appreciation of property; and (iii) no purpose of the investment is used to 
attempt to influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the pub-
lishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any can-
didate for public office); see also Jane M. Searing, Capital With a Conscience, J. ACCT., July 2008, at 
54, available at http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2008/Jul/CapitalWithaConscience (“A 
PRI is often in a risk category that could otherwise result in a jeopardizing investment excise tax penal-
ty. Those penalties are 10% of the amount so invested for each year of a ‘taxable period,’ assessed 
against the private foundation. In addition, 10% can be assessed against any foundation manager who 
knowingly, willfully and without reasonable cause participates in such an investment. A taxable period 
begins with the making of the jeopardizing investment and ends on the mailing date of a notice of defi-
ciency for the initial tax, the date the initial tax is assessed, or the date the investment is removed from 
jeopardy, whichever is earliest. An additional 25% penalty is imposed on the foundation and 5% on the 
manager if such investments are not removed from jeopardy within the taxable period”).
19 IRS User Fees, http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=151979,00.html (last visited Mar. 7, 
2009) (showing a $50,000 fee for private letter rulings for corporations); see also 26 U.S.C. § 
6110(k)(3) (2006) (“Unless the Secretary otherwise establishes by regulations, a written determination 
may not be used or cited as precedent.”).
20 Duros, supra note 9; see also Robert Lang, Charitable Returns, WORTH, Apr. 1, 2006, available 
at http://www.worth.com/Editorial/MoneyMeaning/Philanthropy /OpportunitiesExposu res-
Philanthropy-Charitable-Returns.asp.  
4 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. III:I
cent rate of return and also serve the higher good.21 L3Cs are a hybrid entity –
bringing together market-driven investors and private foundations.22 They are
similar to limited liability companies (“LLCs”) in that they offer protection from 
personal liability like a corporation, have the flexibility of a partnership and can be 
sold in pieces.23 Under the L3C paradigm, the private foundation may agree to 
make an investment based on a submarket rate of return and take the first risk in 
order to entice normal investors, who will look for a higher return with less risk.24
In addition, if Lang has his way, a private foundation would no longer need to ob-
tain a private letter ruling each time it chooses to invest in a L3C.25 In order for 
this to occur, the IRS would need to amend the rules regarding expenditure respon-
sibility reporting in private foundations,26 Congress would need to pass the PRI 
Promotion Act of 200827 and states would need to enact legislation recognizing 
L3Cs as legal entities.28
B. Current Legal Landscape of L3Cs
Although nothing has taken shape in the form of a new IRS rule or the pas-
sage of federal legislation that pertains to PRIs and L3Cs, Lang has been successful 
in persuading three states to enact legislation that recognizes L3Cs as legal corpora-
tions.29 Vermont was the first state to enact L3C legislation.30 The State’s Legis-
lature has stated that “[t]he basic purpose of the L3C is to signal to foundations and 
donor directed funds that entities under this provision intend to conduct their activ-
ities in a way that would qualify as program related investments.”31 Vermont has 
the most registered L3Cs, with forty-three in existence as of March 1, 2009.32
21 Searing, supra note 18.
The 
22 Community Wealth Ventures, supra note 16 (“L3Cs create a market for investment in financially 
risky, but socially beneficial activities”).  
23 Id.
24 Robert M. Lang, Overview, AMERICANS FOR COMMUNITY DEV., http://www.americansfor
communitydevelopment.org/supportingdownloads/ACDOverview.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2009)
(“[B]y using the program related investment, the foundation allows the L3C to turn the normal tranched 
investment structure on its head.  Usually, the investor who assumes the highest risk also enjoys the 
highest return.  With the L3C, the ownership portions with the lowest risk can also enjoy the highest 
reward, making them particularly attractive to market driven investors.”).
25 Searing, supra note 18. 
26 Id.
27 See Duros, supra note 9 (Duros mentions that the Senate Finance Committee is currently consi-
dering draft legislation called the Program Related Investment Promotion Act of 2008).  
28 See Searing, supra note 18.
29 See AmericansforCommunityDevelopment.org, L3C Legislative Watch, http://americansforco 
mmunitydevelopment.org/legislativewatch.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2009) (illustrating that Vermont, 
Wyoming, and Michigan have each passed a L3C bill.  In Illinois, Montana, North Carolina, North Da-
kota, Tennessee, and Utah a L3C bill has been introduced.  In addition, the Crow Indian Nation passed 
legislation that allows for L3Cs in the Crow nation).  
30 Vermont Secretary of State: Corporations Division, Low-Profit Limited Liability Company,
http://www.sec.state.vt.us/corps/dobiz/llc/llc_l3c.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).  
31 Id. (noting that L3Cs are not 501(c)(3) tax exempt entities, and a non-profit wishing to obtain 
such status would need to organize as a non-profit corporation).  
32 Vermont Secretary of State: Corporations Division, Limited Liability Companies Database, 
http://www.sec.state.vt.us/corps/llc.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).  
2009 L3Cs 5
other two states having passed similar legislation lag behind Vermont, with Michi-
gan having only one33 and Wyoming showing no registered L3Cs, as of March 9, 
2009.34
III. ANALYSIS
A. Registration Requirements
Through powers granted to it by Congress,35 the SEC regulates the registra-
tion, offerings, purchase, and sale of securities.36 Within both the Securities Act of 
1933 (the “1933 Act”) as well as the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934
Act”), the definition of security is very broad.37  Thus, an enterprise that has sold 
membership interests either in the form of shares or some other profit-sharing 
agreement must register with the SEC38 Like any well-drafted piece of legislation, 
there are of course exceptions to this registration requirement.39  For instance, un-
der section 4 of the 1933 Act, security transactions are exempt from disclosure and 
registration if they (1) are by an issuer not involving a public offering (private 
placement), (2) were not sold through a general solicitation, and (3) were offers or 
sales by an issuer solely to one or more accredited investors and the offering price 
was below $5,000,000.40  Although exemptions do exist, an organization must be 
very careful in making sure it squarely falls into one of the above exemptions or it 
could face prosecution from the SEC and Department of Justice (the “DOJ”), as 
well as private litigants.41
Therefore, the definition section in the 1933 Act should be quite instructive 
to issuers.42
33 Michigan Department of Energy, Labor and Economic Growth, Corporate Division Business 
Entity Search, http://www.dleg.state.mi.us/bcs_corp/rs_corp.asp?s_ button=sword&v_ search=l3c&
hiddenField=&search=Search (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).  
However, unfortunately, Congress and the SEC have chosen to leave 
34 Wyoming Secretary of State’s Office, Business Division: Database Download, 
https://wyobiz.wy .gov/Ecommerce/Database.aspx (last visited March 9, 2009).    
35 See 15 U.S.C. § 77s (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2006).
36 See generally LOUIS LOSS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION (4th ed. 2006).  
37 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006). See e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(10) (West 2006) (defining security 
as “any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participa-
tion in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-
trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, vot-
ing-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on 
any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or 
based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national se-
curities exchange relating to foreign currency, or in general, any instrument commonly known as a ‘se-
curity’; or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, 
or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or 
any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker’s acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of 
not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is 
likewise limited.”).
38 15 U.S.C. § 77f (2006).  
39 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2006).
40 Id.
41 15 U.S.C. §§ 77x, 77y, 77z-1 (2006).  
42 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2006).
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numerous terms undefined.  For example, under the 1933 Act and Regulation D 
“public offering” is not defined.43 As a result, issuers and their legal counsel have 
to look to case law for instruction.  While interpreting section 4(2) of the 1933 Act, 
the Supreme Court devised a test, referred to as the “Ralston test”, in order to de-
termine whether or not an offering was private.44  The Court utilized the two-part 
test which requires the issuer to prove that (1) the offeree(s) was sophisticated 
enough to not need the protection that is afforded by the registration requirements 
and (2) each offeree(s) had enough access to the type of information that would be 
illustrated in a registration statement had it been filed.45 The Court has held that 
an offeree’s education, experience with investing, and sufficient bargaining power 
to get information determine whether the offeree is sophisticated.46 Finally, the 
Court has held that whether someone had access to information regarding the of-
fering turns on whether the offerees were insider executives, had close relation-
ships to family members in the business, or were outsiders with the wherewithal to 
get information.47
Since Ralston and Doran were decided, courts as well as the SEC have 
looked to the following factors (with no single factor being determinative) in order 
to determine whether the Ralston test has been met.  x The total number of offerees and the relationship they have to each 
other and the issuer48x The total number of securities offered49x The magnitude of the offering50x The manner in which the securities were offered51x The overall experience and sophistication of the offerees involved52
43 Id.
44 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).  See generally STEVEN DRESNER WITH E.
KURT KIM, PIPES: A GUIDE TO PRIVATE INVESTMENTS IN PUBLIC EQUITY (2003).  
45 Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. at 120-27.  
46 Id. at 126.  
47 Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977) (relying on SEC Rule 
146(e) and 17 C.F.R. § 280.146(e) (1976) when stating, “[b]y a position of access we mean a relation-
ship based on factors such as employment, family, or economic bargaining power that enables the offe-
ree effectively to obtain such information.”).  
48 DRESNER, supra note 44, at 111. (“This factor is significant.  There is no maximum permitted 
number of offerees; however, the larger the number, the greater the difficulty sustaining the evidentiary 
burden.  Offering to a large and diverse group with no preexisting relationship to the issuer suggests a 
public offering.”).  
49 Id.  (“The smaller the number, the less likely the offer will be deemed public and subject to reg-
istration.”).  
50 Id.
51 Id. at 112 (“There are two general conditions: (1) the offering should be made through direct 
communication with eligible offerees by either the issuer or the issuer’s agent; and (2) the offering can-
not include any general advertising or general solicitation.”).  
52 Id. (“General business knowledge and experience usually are sufficient.  Important factors to 
consider are education, occupation, business experience, investment experience, and net worth.  An 
investor having a sophisticated representative probably satisfies this test.”). See also Securities Act of 
1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (2006)) (stating
that the purpose of the 1933 Act is to protect investors and “[t]o provide full and fair disclosure of the 
character of securities sold in interstate commerce and foreign commerce and through the mails, and to 
prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for other purposes.”).  
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x The information that was provided to offerees or to which they had 
ready access53x Any actions by the issuer to prevent the resale of the offered securi-
ties54
In order to provide issuers greater clarity on what types of offerings are ex-
empt from the 1933 Act, the SEC implemented Regulation D (“Reg. D”).55  Reg. 
D consists of eight rules, which offer an issuer exemption from registering its se-
curities.56 Although not exhaustive, Rule 501 does offer more guidance to issuers 
in its definition section than the definition sections contained in the 1933 and 1934 
Acts.57
x Institutional investors – such as insurance companies, banks, pension 
plans, etc.
  It defines an “accredited investor” as any person who falls within the fol-
lowing categories:
58x Private business development companies59x Corporations, partnerships and tax-exempt charities – not formed for 
the specific purpose of acquiring the offered securities and with to-
tal assets that exceed $5 million60x General partners, directors and executive officers of the issuer61x Any natural person whose net worth (or joint net worth with spouse) 
at the time of purchase exceeds $1 million62x Any natural person with an income in excess of $200,000 (or 
$300,000 joint income with spouse) in each of the two most recent 
years – the investor must also have a reasonable expectation that in-
come will meet this threshold in the current year63x Trusts - not formed for the specific purpose of acquiring the offered 
securities, with total assets that exceed $5 million, and directed by a 
53 DRESNER, supra note 44, at 112 (noting that the disclosure information does not have to be as 
extensive as what a registered offering needs to show, however it must be “factually equivalent.”).  
54 Id. (“Securities must come to rest in the hand of immediate investors.  Premature resales of se-
curities may be deemed a distribution and considered part of the offering.”).
55 Id. (noting that Reg. D is nonexclusive and that an issuer that has failed to satisfy the criteria of 
Reg. D may still rely on section 4(2) of the 1933 Act); Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508 (2009).
56 Id. at 113-14 (“Rule 501 sets forth definitions for terms used throughout Reg. D.  Rule 502 sets 
forth the general conditions relating to integration, information requirements, limitations on manner of 
offering, and limitations on resale.  Rule 503 requires notices for sales.  Rule 504 provides an exemp-
tion pursuant to Section 3(b) of the Securities Act for offerings up to $1 million.  Rule 505 provides an 
exemption pursuant to Section 3(b) of the Securities Act for offerings up to $5 million.  The rule most 
often relied on for an exemption under Reg. D is Rule 506, the exemption for limited offerings and 
sales without regard to dollar amount.  Although the number of ‘purchasers’ under Rule 506 is limited 
to thirty-five, issuers may sell securities under Rule 506 to an unlimited number of ‘accredited inves-
tors.’).
57 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2009).
58 Id. § 230.501(a)(1).  
59 Id. § 230.501(a)(2).
60 Id. § 230.501(a)(3).  
61 Id. § 230.501(a)(4).  
62 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5) (2009).  
63 Id. § 230.501(a)(6).
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“sophisticated person”64x Any organization that consists of equity owners who are all accre-
dited investors65
Under the National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996 as well as 
the federal preemption doctrine, securities that are exempt from registration under 
a federal securities law exemption, such as section 4(2) of the 1933 Act or Reg. D, 
are exempt from registration under state blue-sky laws.66 However, even if issuers 
can escape the onerous registration and prospectus requirements of the 1933 Act, 
nothing can prevent them escaping section 10b of the 1933 Act and Rule 10b-5
liability.67
First, as the discussion above illustrates, meandering one’s way through the 
U.S. securities laws can be a rather formidable task.  One has to wonder whether 
an organization like the Journal Star would have the resources to employ an indi-
vidual trained in securities laws and competent enough to make sure the organiza-
tion follows all applicable laws.  Organizations like the Journal Star most likely do 
not have anyone in-house who could manage such a task, and also lack the finan-
cial resources to hire a competent securities legal professional.  Even if an organi-
zation is lucky to have a board member who is an attorney and is ready to offer his 
or her services pro bono, the organization still faces the threat that his or her offer-
ing will not be exempt.  If this occurs and the organization needs to undergo the 
registration process, it will face exorbitant costs.68
The prospect of an organization like the Journal Star being exempt from the 
registration process under section 7 of the 1933 Act
If an organization like the 
Journal Star is already cash strapped, it seems unlikely that it would be able to pay 
for the registration process.  
69 also seems unlikely.  First, 
an offering such as the one the Journal Star is considering would most likely fail 
the Ralston test.70 Organizations like the Journal Star would most likely seek to 
have as many offerees as possible in order to raise the most capital.  Furthermore, 
the magnitude of the offering, albeit nowhere near the size of Visa’s feat,71
64 Id. § 230.501(a)(7); see 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2009). (which defines a sophisticated in-
vestor as one with “knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is capable of 
evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment, or the issuer reasonably believes imme-
diately prior to making any sale that such purchaser comes within this description.”).  
could 
65 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(8) (2009).
66 DRESNER, supra note 44, at 120-21 (drawing a distinction between Rule 506, which was prom-
ulgated under section 4(2), and Rules 504 and 505, which were issued under section 3(b)).
67 Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009) (stating that it is unlawful for any person, directly or 
indirectly, to engage in fraud or deceit in the purchase or sale of any security).  
68 See ANDREW J. SHERMAN, RAISING CAPITAL: GETTING THE MONEY YOU NEED TO GROW YOUR 
BUSINESS 208-09 (2d ed., AMACOM 2005) (2000) (noting that organizations face a hefty expenditure 
between $200,000 to $500,000 in legal, accounting, appraisal, printing, consulting, and filing fees asso-
ciated with a public offering--not including the underwriter’s or broker’s commission, which can be ten 
percent or more of the total offering).  
69 15 U.S.C. § 77f (2006).
70 Comment, Employee Stock Offerings under the Securities Act: The Ralston Purina Case, 21 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 113, 113-18 (1953) (noting that issue of employee stock offerings must be analyzed on a 
case by case basis, but opining that the Ralston decision was consistent with the underlying purpose of 
the Securities Act).  
71 Sam Zuckerman, Visa Shares Soar After Biggest U.S. IPO Ever, S.F. CHRON., MAR. 20, 2008, at 
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be high enough for a court to deem it a public offering.  The offering will most 
likely fail the Ralston test as well due to the manner in which the securities will be 
offered.  Because there has been so much communication in the press, while less 
than an advertisement but more than innocuous reporting, courts could deem the 
offering to have been a “communication published in any newspaper” and there-
fore a public offering.72 Finally, there is reason to believe that the Journal Star will 
most likely be attracting sophisticated investors, like banks, as well as tax-exempt 
charities.  However, it is also equally likely that the Journal Star and others will 
sell memberships to lay citizens in the community and therefore fail the Ralston
test due to the lack of sophistication of some offerees.73
If an organization fails to satisfy the Ralston standard, it will look to Reg. D 
for a possible exemption from registration.  However, organizations like the Jour-
nal Star will presumably fail to stay within the dollar limits ($1 million and $5 mil-
lion, respectively) imposed by Rules 504 and 505.74 In addition, although Rule 
506 does not contain a dollar limit75 and some investors will fall within the “accre-
dited investor” exception, not all offerees of L3C security offerings will fall into 
one of the defined categories.76
B. Disclosure Requirements
As a result, organizations like the Journal Star will 
more than likely need to register their security offering with the SEC.
While the 1933 Act is most concerned with the offering and registration 
process, the 1934 Act deals with secondary trading.77 However, just like the 1933 
Act, the 1934 Act was based on a concern that investors in securities were not sa-
tisfactorily protected against manipulative schemes, misrepresentation, and inade-
quate disclosure.78
C-1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/03/19/BURLVMIOK.DTL 
(highlighting Visa’s sale of 406 million shares for just under $18 billion).  
The main thrust of the 1934 Act lies within section 10b and 
72 See DOUGLAS L. HAMMER ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS 213 (2005).  The fol-
lowing factors are usually considered when determining whether a solicitation or advertisement violates 
Rule 502(c): “[t]he relationship, if any, between the issuer and the person making the communication, 
[t]he relationship, if any, between the issuer and the person receiving the communication, [t]he timing 
of the communication, and [t]he subject matter of the communication.”  Id. at 214.
73 See Richards, supra note 7, (noting “Peoria Newspaper Guild official Jennifer Towery will de-
scribe ... how a community coalition is pushing legislation to turn her city’s struggling privately owned 
paper into a ‘low profit’ L3C community-owned operation.”).
74 Rules 504-05, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504-.505 (2009).  
75 Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2009).  
76 Rule 501, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2009).  
77 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-mm (2006).
78 S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 3-4 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES 
ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Item No. 17 
(J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973); see also Wallis K. Finger, Note, Unsophisticated 
Wealth: Reconsidering the SEC’s “Accredited Investor” Definition Under the 1933 Act, 86 WASH U.
L.R. 733, 737 n.30 (2009) (noting that “the 1934 Act has four purposes: ‘to afford a measure of disclo-
sure to people who buy and sell securities; to prevent and afford remedies for fraud in securities trading 
and manipulation of the markets; to regulate the securities markets; and to control the amount of the 
Nation’s credit that goes into those markets.’”) (quoting LOUIS LOSS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 
328 (4th ed. 2006)).  
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Rule 10b-5, which was promulgated under the 1934 Act.79 These far-reaching 
laws make it unlawful for any person who in the connection of the purchase or sale 
of any security, defrauds, makes any untrue statement of a material fact, or omits 
to state a material fact.80 In addition to its aim to protect investors from fraud, the 
1934 Act also seeks to mandate adequate disclosures from companies that are reg-
istered with the SEC under sections 12, 13, and 15.81 These sections impose re-
porting requirements upon companies that are either listed on stock exchanges or 
sold over-the-counter.82  However, not all securities that are sold over-the-counter 
are required to register.83  If a company ultimately registers with the SEC, then it 
must make annual as well as quarterly reports to the SEC.84 In addition, a compa-
ny must file a “current report” if a significant event occurs.85 Preparing and filing 
these reports can run a company thousands of dollars.86
Even if an organization like the Journal Star is able to escape the registration 
requirements under the 1933 Act, it still may face registration obligations under the 
1934 Act.  This is mainly due to the size of the offering.  Given the fact that organ-
izations like the Journal Star may wish to sell membership rights to community 
members, it is not unfathomable for such an offering to grow to be greater than $10 
million and 500 shareholders and therefore fall within the scope of the 1934 Act.  
If this occurs, the organization must register the offering with the SEC and file 
costly periodic financial reports until the company effectively “goes dark.”87
C. Fiduciary Duties
Courts have held that, in a broad sense, officers and directors of a corpora-
79 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009).  
80 § 204.10b-5.  
81 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l, 78m, 78o (2006).
82 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a), (b), (g) (2006); Rule 12g-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (2009). 
83 § 240.12g-4.  A company that has less than $10 million in assets and fewer than 500 sharehold-
ers is exempt from registration.  Id. In addition, the following are also exempt from registration re-
quirements: securities of organizations operated exclusively for religious, educational, or charitable 
purposes; securities of investment companies; and securities of savings and loan companies that are 
regulated by state or federal agencies.  Id.
84 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2006) (outlining Forms 10-K, 10-KSB, 10-Q, and 10-QSB).
85 Id. (mentioning Form 8-K).  
86 Analysis of Small Business Advocacy Review Panels as Required Under the Small Business Reg-
ulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 Before the Subcomm. on Gov’t. Programs and Oversight and 
the Subcomm. on Reg. Reform and Paperwork Reduction, 105th Cong. (1998), available at 
http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/testimony/test3-18.html (statement of Jere W. Glover, Chief Counsel for 
Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration) (“[A] study of 265 companies showed that reporting 
costs for quarterly 10-Q and annual 10-K reports were over $50,000. The disclosure requirements im-
pose a heavier burden on small companies than on large companies because the costs are largely 
fixed.”), but see Cyanotech Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 63 (Aug. 16, 2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/768408/000110465907063150/a07-17460_110k.htm (show-
ing that small businesses can incur costly filing fees since the fees incurred by Cyanotech Corporation 
“for professional services rendered for the audit of the Company’s annual financial statements and time-
ly quarterly reviews for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2007 and 2006 were $361,600 and $162,700, 
respectively.”).  
87 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-4 (noting that a public company can go private if the outstanding secur-
ities are less than $10 million and it has less than 500 shareholders for the last 3 years or if at the begin-
ning of the fiscal year it is held by less than 300 persons.
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tion are in fact agents of that corporation.88 Despite the fact that officers and di-
rectors are not considered to be trustees,89 they are deemed to hold a fiduciary rela-
tionship with the shareholders and public corporation as a whole.90 Other courts 
have gone even further and have held that a fiduciary duty exists even in closely-
held companies.91 Furthermore, directors and officers within non-profit entities 
have been considered to also have fiduciary relationships with the organization as 
well as the people they serve.92 Although each state has a slightly different varia-
tion, there are generally three broad duties that officers and directors owe to a cor-
poration, including the duty of loyalty,93 the duty of care,94 and a duty of good 
faith.95 In addition to these well-established fiduciary duties, Congress passed the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”),96 which aims to restore investor confidence 
in the markets.97 The additional regulation added extra compliance and gover-
nance costs for public companies, which were already spending thousands of dol-
lars in order to meet their reporting requirements.98 However, these changes did 
not only affect public companies, they also influenced nonprofit organizations as 
well.99
If the Journal Star and others, who wish to become L3C entities, end up hav-
ing to register their security offerings with the SEC, they face crippling costs asso-
ciated with disclosure requirements.  This could seriously hamstring these small 
businesses and prevent them from carrying out their missions.  As a result, these 
organizations may find it difficult to attract more investors and ultimately may 
88 See In re Allegheny Int’l, Inc., 954 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1992) (applying Pennsylvania law); see 
also Jordan v. Hunter, 865 P.2d 990 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993).
89 See Jackson v. Ludeling, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 616 (1874).
90 United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972).  
91 Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
92 Kelley v. Astor Investors, Inc., 478 N.E.2d 1346, 1348 (Ill. 1985); see also MARION R.
FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND 
REGULATION 15 (2004) (noting that although fiduciary duties do exist, since so many protections or 
“shields” for directors’ services in non-profits also exist, it is often difficult for an attorney general to 
build a strong case alleging a breach of fiduciary duty).  
93 Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 403 (Del. 1987); see also Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 
(Del. 2006).
94 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
95 In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holder Litig., 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2003).
96 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C §§ 7241-7244, , 7261-7262, 7264-7265  (2007).  
97 See John C. Coates IV, The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, 21 J. ECON. PERSP.
91, 91 (2007) (“At its core, the Sarbanes–Oxley legislation was designed to fix auditing of U.S. public 
companies, which is consistent with the official name of the law: the Public Company Accounting 
Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002. By consensus of investors and Wall Street professionals 
alike, auditing had been working poorly. Sarbanes–Oxley created a unique, quasi-public institution to 
oversee and regulate auditing, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).”).
98 See William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of “Going 
Private,” 55 EMORY L.J. 141, 148 (2006). A 2004 study found that total compliance with SOX has an 
average cost of $3.14 million for each large company, plus an additional $1,037,100 in software costs.  
Id. Furthermore, a 2002 study estimated $250,000 in average costs for a small company. Id. at 148 
n.58.
99 See generally Francie Ostrower & Marla J. Bobowick, Nonprofit Governance and the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2006 THE URB. INST., available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311363
_nonprofit_governance.pdf.
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need to shut down their operations.  In addition, given that L3Cs will be profit-
generating entities, it is highly unlikely that states will grant these organizations 
“shield laws”100
D. Overlapping Policing 
that serve to protect directors and officers from personal liability.  
As a result, it will be difficult for L3Cs to attract top talent who would rather either 
make more money at another for-profit organization or be protected from liability 
at a nonprofit.
In order to be legally recognized in the U.S., a business must register with a 
secretary of state’s office.101 Once organized, both the federal and state govern-
ment then regulate the business.102 The U.S. Department of Labor does the ma-
jority of regulating of businesses on the federal level,103 while each state has the 
authority to regulate businesses104 as long as those regulations do not impede inter-
state commerce.105  The policing of businesses in the U.S. usually falls within the 
purview of either the U.S. Office of the Attorney General106 or each state’s attor-
ney general’s office.  In addition, if an organization is a nonprofit entity, it will al-
so receive attention from the Internal Revenue Service.107
Since the main purpose of the L3C structure is centered on attracting market-
driven investors as well as non-profit foundations, there is a strong chance that 
U.S. tax dollars will be wasted in the duplicative policing of these organizations.  
The redundancy of regulating these organizations on both the state and federal lev-
el would appear to not have even a modicum of rationality particularly given the 
current financial status of the United States.
This governance is of 
course in addition to any regulation that the SEC exercises if any securities are of-
fered by a business.
108
100 See J. STEVEN OTT, UNDERSTANDING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: GOVERNANCE,
LEADERSHIP, AND MANAGEMENT 78 (2001).  
This potential redundancy could 
101 See MICHAEL SPADACCINI, INCORPORATE YOUR BUSINESS: IN ANY STATE 41 (2007).
102 See generally Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (holding the power to regulate 
interstate commerce was granted to Congress via the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.); see 
also Business.gov, http://www.business.gov (last visited Mar. 11, 2009) (educating business owners on 
important laws including advertising, employment, environmental, finance, patents, trademarks, copy-
right, privacy, Uniform Commercial Code as workplace safety and health laws).  
103 See United States Department of Labor, http://www.dol.gov/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
104 See JOHN E. MOYE, THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 159 (Delmar Cengage Learning 
6th ed. 2004) (1974)  (noting that “[t]he law of corporations was developed by each state to regulate the 
internal affairs of the corporations that state had chartered to do business within its boundaries.”).
105 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 579-80 (1995) (reminding the reader that “there is 
widespread acceptance of our authority to enforce the dormant Commerce Clause, which we have but 
inferred from the constitutional structure as a limitation on the power of the States.  One element of our 
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence has been the principle that the States may not impose regula-
tions that place an undue burden on interstate commerce….”).
106 See generally United States Department of Justice, http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/ (last visited Mar. 
11, 2009).
107 See generally IRS.gov, Tax Information for Charities & Other Non-profits, http://www.irs.gov/ 
charities/index.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).  
108 See, e.g., Sara Murray, State Budget Deficits Continue to Widen, WALL ST. J, Feb. 3, 2009, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2009/02/03/state-budget-deficits-continue-to-widen/ (noting that 
“[a]lready 34 states are predicting budget gaps totaling $84.3 billion for fiscal 2010”), see also Jeff Ba-
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help to thwart the adoption of these organizations by states that already have their 
hands full.109
IV. CONCLUSION
This does not bode well for the Journal Stars of the world.  
There is no arguing that L3Cs may someday offer organizations like the 
Journal Star access to capital that has not been traditionally available.  However, 
without some measures put in place, there is a strong likelihood that this organiza-
tional structure will not help organizations like the Journal Star survive.  This is 
due to the onerous registration and disclosure requirements of the SEC, the costly 
compliance requirements of SOX, as well as the lack of officer and director liabili-
ty protection.  Furthermore, given the fact that these organizations will most likely 
come into the purview of numerous governmental agencies, at both a federal and 
state level, states may be reluctant to adopt this organizational structure until there 
is a clearer picture as to how efficient governance of L3Cs will occur.  
_______________________________________________________
ter, U.S. Posted $192.78 Billion Total Budget Deficit in February, WALL ST. J, Mar. 11, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123679494938097961.html?mod=googlenews_wsj. 
109 See, e.g., WSJ Staff, Buffett Says Economy Has ‘Fallen Off a Cliff’, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2009, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2009/03/09/buffett-says-economy-has-fallen-off-a-cliff/.
